The Netherlands Indies in Aceh, Bali and Buton: degrees of resistance and acceptance of indirect and direct rule by Bakker, Hans
The Netherlands Indies in Aceh, Bali and Buton: 
degrees of resistance and acceptance of indirect and 
direct rule 
 




Leidschrift, jaargang 24, nummer 1, april 2009 
                                                
The basic argument that I would like to make is that the notion of 
‘resistance’ needs to be tempered by a careful examination of specific 
historical and sociological details. Interpretation should not be merely an 
ideological reflex. Yet for many people the study of rebellions against 
colonialism is extrapolated into a general model of history. But, colonial 
indirect rule did not always result in rebellion. Indeed, colonial rule 
sometimes led to degrees of acceptance. I would like to illustrate that idea 
by mentioning three case study examples: Bali, Aceh, and Buton. 
 Many people around the world have heard of Bali. After the tsunami 
more people learned about Aceh. But very few people have ever heard of 
Buton. In this article I would like to briefly mention those three places in 
Indonesia as examples of communities which can be considered in the 
context of the debate on resistance to imperialism. Many other places could 
be considered in terms of resistance and rebellion as well.1 My central thesis 
is that the Republic of Indonesia as it exists today is a complex secular 
entity. Because Indonesia is such a complex place any generalizations made 
about resistance today or in the past must be tempered by a careful 
acknowledgment of internal differences. Some authors have presented a 
very black and white picture. For example, in the Indonesia heritage series the 
brief articles are written by academic scholars, but they frequently provide a 
one-sided view.2 The various political entities that have existed in the 
 
1 Ken Young, Islamic peasants and the state: the 1908 anti-tax rebellion in West Sumatra 
(New Haven 1994). This study of the Minangkabau and the resilience of their 
institutions is a sophisticated narrative of the subtle interplay of sources of 
legitimate authority. The rebellion of 1908 in West Sumatra could easily constitute a 
fourth case study example. Rural ulama of one tarekat played a significant role.  
2 Anthony Reid ed., Indonesia heritage: early modern history (Singapore and Jakarta 2001). 
This book is an outstanding resource, but the scholars who have contributed to it 
are limited to very brief discussions of two pages. Readers should always consult 
the excellent bibliography and read the fuller accounts. See David. H. Fischer, 
Albion’s seed: four British folkways in America (Oxford 1989) vii-xi, 3-11, for an 
authoritative statement of the attempt to combine the older and newer approaches 




Indonesian archipelago in the last several hundred years are social 
constructs and a dispassionate look at the historical background reveals that 
the histories of those places is often more complex than summaries in 
popular guidebooks tend to indicate.  
 The importance of ‘imagined communities’ (or ‘imagined nations’)3 
needs to be considered from various perspectives and at various levels, 
from micro (hamlet) to macro (nation and world system). Are the issues 
being analyzed in a balanced and scholarly manner by Helius Sjamsuddin 
and other Indonesian scholars interested in resistance?4 Is there bias 
involved in viewing resistance to the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.) as 
always being in the short-term and long-term best interest of Indonesians? 
The question is particularly poignant today since the Republic of Indonesia 
has made enormous strides in recent years. Yet many journalists and 
political commentators still maintain an attitude toward the federal 
government that is highly critical. The three cases briefly reviewed here 
represent a range of reactions. If one studies only a single case then one gets 
a different impression of resistance than if all three are considered 
simultaneously. The story of Bali is widely reported, but not always with a 
great deal of respect for the facts. Aceh has become widely known since the 
tsunami that hit Southeast and South Asia on December 26th, 2004. The 
small ‘kingdom’ of Buton, which included Buton island and Muna island, is 
not well known to most Indonesians, much less Indonesianists, but it 
provides an important and neglected example.5  
                                                                                                             
to historical inquiry in a more interdisciplinary approach that I would call 
‘comparative historical sociology’. 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism (London 1983). Anderson is well known for his outstanding 
contributions to Indonesian studies, but this book has applicability outside of 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Indeed, most scholars view it as applicable to the 
study of the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ world-wide. 
4 Helius Sjamsuddin, ‘Islam and resistance in South and Central Kalimantan in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ in M. C. Ricklefs ed., Islam in the Indonesian 
social context (Clayton, Australia 1991) 7-17.  
5 Sometimes the words ‘Butung’ or ‘Wolio’ are used. Butung is another small town 
in the region. Wolio is one key language. My involvement with Buton-Wolio first 
began in 1986 when I worked as a consultant for the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), on an integrated rural development project on 
Muna Island. I was able to have discussions with several Butonese ‘aristocrats’ and 
obtained photocopies of rare documents pertaining to the history of that little 




 In the social sciences – the ‘uncertain sciences’6 – there is more 
concern with comparative generalizations, while idiographic historians, like 
John Smail, prefer detailed summaries of specific events.7 Professor Sartono 
Kartodirdjo, the sociological historian who has contributed more to the 
study of resistance and rebellion in Java than any other author, is one of the 
few who has been able to combine both historical depth and sociological 
breadth. Rather than try to summarize professor Kartodirdjo’s lasting 
contribution here I will examine three cases outside of Java: Aceh, Bali and 
Buton.8  
 The struggles in Aceh are often viewed by outsiders in ways that do 
not do full justice to the whole story. Framing the struggles within 
Indonesian Islam as one between so-called ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ 
versions of Islam, as Deliar Noer points out, can be misleading.9 It is 
generally accepted that all Indonesian Muslims should follow Islamic law 
(shari’ah), but the precise interpretation of Islamic law (and ‘Muhammadan 
Law’) is a matter of dispute. What is clear is that the Republic of Indonesia’s 
historical background is very important for the future of that republic and 
that a Eurocentric (for example, dogmatic Marxist) or an Orientalist 
perspective will not be constructive. But what is sometimes less clear is that 
an Islamo-centric perspective can also bias the history of a secular nation-
state.  
                                                                                                             
known political entity from Abdul Mulku Zahari. I had further discussions with the 
district head (bupati) and relatives of the former raja when I made a second visit to 
the province of Southeast Sulawesi in 1988 in order to study local migration by the 
Bajo (Bajau-sama) ‘sea gypsies’ in one village near Mawasangka-Gu on the southwest 
coast of Muna Island.  
6 Bruce Mazlish, The uncertain sciences (New Brunswick, N.J. 2007). 
7 Mazlish, The uncertain sciences, 83-128 emphasizes the importance of Interpretative 
approaches, which he dubs ‘hermeneutics’, following Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth 
and method (New York 1992). There is a great deal of variety among different 
Interpretative hermeneutic approaches to socio-cultural, historical sciences. Mazlish 
considers both Marx and Weber as Interpretative rather than Positivistic. But many 
Marxists think of Marx’s theories as strictly scientific. See J.I. Bakker on 
‘Interpretivism’ in: Albert Mills et al. ed., Encyclopedia of case study research (New York 
2009). 
8 Sartono Kartodirdjo, ‘Agrarian radicalism in Java: its setting and development’ in: 
Claire Holt ed., Culture and politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y. 1972). 
9 Deliar Noer, The modernist Mulism movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 
(Singapore 1973). 




 Thus, while it is very important to study the roots of resistance, it is 
equally relevant to examine the roots of non-resistance and open support. 
Some people in the archipelago remained neutral or accepted aspects of 
European influence. A case in point is the Protestant Christian Minahassa.  
 
Minahasa, on the northeastern peninsula of Sulawesi, was fringe 
territory of the sultanate of Ternate. It realized an independent 
existence through links to the Dutch and conversion to Christianity. 
(…) The oldest treaty between tribal leaders and the Dutch, dating 
from 1679, defined land borders to west and east and freed the tribes 
from tax obligations to the sultan of Ternate.10
 
During the nineteenth century the population doubled and a high 
percentage of the population was baptized. Schools were established. A 
high degree of rational legal bureaucracy had set in by the 1890s. Such a 
high degree of acceptance is quite a different story than resistance based in 




The concept of resistance  
 
The question of resistance to external influences pre-supposes a unified 
internal civilization of some sort.12 However, before Muslim traders – many 
of them Sufis – brought a version of Islam to the northwestern parts of the 
archipelago (for example, Aceh), starting in the thirteenth century, or even 
earlier, the archipelago was a rich tapestry of many different indigenous 
collectivities. In fact, it is anachronistic to speak of anything called 
‘Indonesia’ until the declaration of independence (merdeka) on August 17, 
1945. Moreover, whatever unity there is in the diversity of the many island 
cultures today was largely a product of the early part of the twentieth 
century and World War II. The modern nation-state of Indonesia is based 
on secular principles. That is very important to understand. The 
                                                 
10 Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia: peoples and histories (New Haven 2003). 
11 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Origins and development of the Sufi orders (tarékat) in 
Southeast Asia’, Studia Islamika 1 (1) (1994) 1-23. Retrieved 16 February 2009 at 
www.let.uu.nl/martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications. 
12 S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Civilizations’ in: George Ritzer ed., The Blackwell encyclopedia of 
sociology (Malden, MA 2007) 519-529. 




conceptualization of a secular modern nation-state is radically at odds with 
the idea of an Islamic state, or any theocratic state. Much of the violent 
resistance to Dutch colonialism hinged on this point and much of the 
violent resistance to the Republic of Indonesia has continued to revolve 
around the same point. 
In Aceh there were leaders who wanted to make the whole 
archipelago an Islamic state. Similarly, in Bali the traditional leaders favored 
theocratic principles.13 The term ‘secular’ can have several different and 
contradictory meanings. The semantic elusiveness of it has led to many 
disputes about the true meaning of the five basic principles of the 
Indonesian state originally enunciated by Sukarno (Pancasila). These five 
principles evoke the five principles of Hinayana Buddhism and the Five 
Pillars of Islam, but also the mixture of indigenous animism and the eighth-
century esoteric Vairochana cult of Mahayana Buddhism. It is probably the 
case that both Sukarno and Suharto thought of the core of religion in terms 
of the indigenous religion of Central Java, agama Java.14 Like arguments 
concerning the American Constitution, there is continued dialogue about 
the precise meaning of all five principles. A clear implication seems to be 
that Indonesia is not an exclusively Muslim state and that the ‘world 
religions’ which recognize one God are all equal. Note that for Suharto one 
God was a mystical ‘Godhead’ as is found in agama Java. That recognition of 
tolerance of widely different religions leads to state secularism. Indonesia 
today is not an Islamic state, despite the large Muslim population.15
Historians and social scientists take somewhat different approaches 
to ‘resistance’ depending on theoretical orientation. In this chapter I will 
take a Neo-Weberian comparative-historical approach16 rather than a Neo-
Marxist approach and emphasize variations in resistance.17 The ability to 
                                                 
13 I Wayan Ardika, ‘Bali during the early classic period’ and ‘late classic period’ and 
Endang Sri Hardiati, ‘Bali in the middle classic period’ in: John Miksic ed., Indonesian 
heritage: Ancient history (Singapore and Jakarta 2001) 70-71, 106-07, 122-23. 
14 Allen Sievers, The Mystical world of Indonesia: culture & economic development 
in conflict (Baltimore 1974) 7-10. 
15 One very misleading aspect of journalistic accounts of Indonesia is the notion 
that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia, like Turkey 
and India, is a secular nation-state and is therefore fundamentally different from 
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  
16 Randall Collins, The sociology of philosophies (Cambridge, MA 1986). 
17 The Neo-Marxian and Neo-Weberian approaches do not need to be considered 
as fundamentally in opposition. Hence, we can regard Eric Wolf, for example, as 




discern variations in resistance is part and parcel of acceptance of a notion 
of the ‘imagined community’ that is secular and tolerant. If we start with the 
idea that the ideal state is a theocratic state then there can be little 
meaningful discussion of variation. The ‘bias’ that dominates in modern 
scholarship is a European Enlightenment bias rather than an ‘Islamic’ 
traditional bias.  
Hence, unfortunately, the idea of resistance is treated by many 
Indonesian scholars from a primarily Islamic point of view, with opposition 
framed in terms of legitimate Islamic struggles against the colonial power. 
The rebellions are assumed to be entirely legitimate, without question, 
because it is an Islamic struggle against infidels. In the minds of some 
writers colonialism is associated with infidel Christians. The grain of truth in 
that perspective should not cloud the larger importance in the long run of a 
secular, post-Enlightenment perspective. It is legitimate to point to abuses 
of colonialism. Imperialism was frequently not a matter of benevolent rule. 
But the Republic of Indonesia is also based on the post-Enlightenment idea 
of a secular nation-state that, at least in principle, remains tolerant of a 
variety of different religious faiths (Pancasila). Some Islamic groups have 
legitimate grievances against centralizing rule. However, they sometimes 
frame their grievances in terms of the need for a violent jihad.  
That idea has led to recent tragedies, like the thousands of deaths 
which resulted in part from the military actions of the federal government 
against the Free Aceh Movement, an Islamic resistance to Suharto’s rule 
and a secular nation-state that was proclaimed by Teungku Hasan 
Muhammad di Tiro in October 1976. That was an echo of the previous 
Islamic resistance in Aceh that was led by Teungku Haji Cik di Toro against 
the N.E.I.’s government between 1881-1891. Cik di Toro is considered a 
national hero, but the Suharto government did not accept the notion that 
Muhammad di Tiro against the federal government was a continuation of 
the colonial-era struggles against the N.E.I. colonial state and the V.O.C., 
the kumpeni.18 The key here is not the idiographic details of the historical 
events. The key instead is the realization that two basic principles of 
legitimate authority were in collision: the Islamic state principle versus the 
secular nation-state principle.  
                                                                                                             
either Neo-Weberian or Neo-Marxian. But Wolf’s work is not ‘Neo-Marxist’ and 
certainly not ‘Marxist-Leninist’ in the strict sense. 
18 Taylor, Indonesia, 364-370. 




If I were an Islamic scholar who is opposed to secularism I would 
discuss the case of Aceh quite differently. But I am not a Muslim and I do 
not believe in theocracy. Instead, I am a social scientist whose underlying 
premise is the importance of religious tolerance within the modern nation-
state.19 The term resistance is treated here as a kind of variable, along an 
ordinal scale, from staunch resistance (Aceh at the end of the nineteenth 
century, and three principalities in Bali, 1906-1908) to relative acceptance (six 
principalities in Bali and the Buton Sultanate). There are probably few cases 
of staunch acceptance of what is perceived as foreign domination, but in 
situations where small states accept the legitimate authority of a relatively 
benign colonial power, rather than what is perceived as the domination of 
an existing foreign power, we can speak of a degree of acceptance. That is 
especially true under indirect rule. Moreover, we must also stop to consider 
the broader issue of the gradual acceptance of Islam itself. Islam, after all, is 
also a force from outside.  
The acceptance of Islamic theology by Muslim societies like Ternate, 
Buton, Makassar and Melaka could be considered an example of acceptance 
that is more than just superficial or convenient.20 While Muslim trade routes 
may have existed as early as the ninth century, it was not until the 
fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that a string of small Muslim 
states existed in the archipelago.21 Islam was gradually assimilated, yet it 
must be admitted that Islamic beliefs originating in the Arab peninsula are 
foreign to the archipelago. It was colonization, but not nineteenth century 
imperialism. The ‘axial age’ Islamic Civilization22 that came to the 
archipelago we now know as Indonesia is not usually considered an 
imperialistic colonial influence, but it was definitely a ‘foreign’ import and it 
                                                 
19 To be perfectly clear, there are many outstanding Islamic scholars who do not 
advocate theocratic notions. Indeed, there is a wide range of opinion within Islam. 
Many Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere do not advocate an Islamic theocratic 
state. See Gudrun Krämer, ‘The contest of values: Notes on contemporary Islamic 
discourse’ in: Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt ed., The cultural values of Europe 
(Liverpool 2008) 338-356. My own religious background is Congregationalist 
Protestant and I attend the Unitarian-Universalist Church. The U-U is centred on 
tolerance and absence of dogmatic theology. 
20 K.S. Sandhu and P. Wheatley, Melaka: the transformation of a Malay capital c. 1400-
1980 (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore 1983). 
21 Peter G. Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian world (Honolulu 2001); Taylor, 
Indonesia, 60-87. 
22 Eisenstadt, ‘Civilizations’, 519-29. 




also evoked various kinds of resistance. The political economy of Islamic 
expansion is usually considered to have little to do with modern capitalism, 
even though it is definitely an aspect of generic, pre-modern ‘capitalism’. In 
fact, some scholars even consider Islam the direct opposite to Western 
modernity.23 That conservative idea does not necessarily run counter to 
Marxism, but it is not explained by extreme versions of the Marxist-Leninist 
thesis concerning imperialism as one of the later stages of modern 
monopoly capitalism.24 Acceptance did take place, and not always under 
duress. But that does not fit the popular stereotype of outsider influence.  
 The Indonesian archipelago is a very complex tapestry and thousands 
of stories – most of them as yet untold – run simultaneously. It is only in 
introductory textbooks that it all fits into one neat pattern of exploiters and 
resistors. One cannot understand the Butonese, for example, without some 
understanding of how they were exploited by Ternate, Makassar and the 
Islamic Buginese, some of whom had a role as mercenaries.25 The 
Europeans (including the Portuguese, English and Dutch) were often 
expoiters and foes, but they were also frequently operating on the fringe and 
regarded as allies, or not taken note of very much at all.26 Similarly, it is 
somewhat Euro-centric to overemphasize the impact of the Europeans 
(particularly the Portuguese, English and Dutch) and de-emphasize the 
significance of the Chinese, Arab and Indian presence. The Arab and Indian 
Islamic presence is particularly important, but it is inter-dependent with the 
presence of Chinese traders and merchants. The story is much more 
complicated than a kind of development of underdevelopment. In that 
respect Geertz’s famous ‘involution’ thesis concerning parts of Java does 
not do full justice to what was happening in all parts of Java, much less the 
rest of the archipelago.27 There would not have been involution on most 
parts of islands like Sulawesi.  
                                                 
23 Samuel Phillip Huntington, The clash of civilizations: remaking of world order 
(New York 1997). 
24 Originally Lenin argued that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism, but a great 
deal has happened since Lenin put forward that argument. Contemporary Marxist 
critiques of ‘globalization’ tend to move beyond the original Leninist argument, the 
kernel of which Lenin drew from John A. Hobson; See also Irving Zeitlin, 
Capitalism and imperialism (Chicago 1972). 
25 M.C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (London 19813) 10, 67; 
Taylor, Indonesia, 94, 107. 
26 Ricklefs, A history, 169-201; Taylor, Indonesia, 184-86. 
27 Clifford Geertz, Agricultural involution (Berkeley, CA 1979). 




After the mid-nineteenth century the N.E.I. government became 
more and more of an imperial state and a true N.E.I. started around 1906-
08. There was certainly staunch resistance to intrusion in some parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago. Outside interference meant changes in relatively 
long-term ‘traditional’ rulership. But in some places and in certain respects 
European ‘rational legal’ modern capitalism was preferable to pre-modern 
forms of ‘domination’ and legitimate authority (Herrschaft). As Weber 
explains in extensive detail, the rise of modern capitalism requires rational 
legal bureaucratic administration rather than patrimonial-feudal or 
patrimonial-prebendal traditional bureaucracies.28  
 
The study of resistance to empire is difficult. The whole idea of empire 
itself is very broad. The term evokes, for example, the Roman Empire and 
the Holy Roman Empire, both of which precede modern capitalism. Even 
if we ignore pre-modern empires that existed before modern capitalism and 
only consider the last five centuries or so the tendency is to think in very 
broad terms indeed. There are ideological interpretations that tend to stress 
the Marxist-Leninist notion that imperialism is by definition evil and that 
any form of indigenous rule is better than outside intervention. Often the 
historical record is distorted by nationalist rhetoric that served a useful 
purpose during periods of political struggle, as in the 1930s and 1950s. But 
what nationalist leaders like Sukarno said in emotionally-charged speeches, 
often on the basis of generalizations that were in part informed by 
conflicting adaptations of vaguely Marxist and Leninist ideas, should not be 
taken as historically accurate.  
 Dutch colonialism in Indonesia was not simply a matter of bad 
Europeans exploiting good Indonesians. For most of ‘Indonesian’ history 
there simply were no ‘Indonesians,’ only Butonese, Balinese, Javanese, 
Acehnese, and so forth.29 For the most part, except in isolated circles, the 
idea of a ‘Pan-Indonesian identity’ did not develop until the twentieth 
                                                 
28 Max Weber, Economy and society (Berkeley, CA 1968); J.I. Bakker, ‘Class relations in 
Java in the nineteenth century: a Weberian perspective’, Canadian journal of 
development studies 8 (1987) 137-156. 
29 The more than 13 677 islands, large and small, that make up the archipelago have 
many quite varied population groups and represent around nine hundred different 
languages. The use of Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) makes it somewhat easier to 
have national unity, but it will always be ‘unity in diversity’ (bhinneka tunggal ika). 
The Republic of Indonesia is a secular nation-state.  




century. The conflict with Malaysia and the more recent events in Timor 
Timor (East Timor) indicate that the precise contours of Indonesian 
identity are still not completely settled. Paradoxically, one aspect of Dutch 
colonialism in the archipelago that definitely had a positive impact on the 
Republic of Indonesia is the creation of a political entity that spans a large 
part of the archipelago and is not just rooted in a small part of Central 
Sumatra or Central Java. Despite the claims of the Majapahit rulers that they 
had already unified the whole archipelago in the fifteenth century, it is 
actually only during the 1920s and 1930s that it is reasonable to speak of a 
relatively unified political entity. The modern nation-state of Indonesia 
would not exist in its present form as the fifth largest country in the world 
had it not been for the Dutch colonial presence. Sukarno himself was well 
aware of that, but he de-emphasized it in his efforts to achieve political 
independence, which he proclaimed on August 17, 1945, immediately after 
the Japanese surrender during World War II. Like every other nation-state 
in the world today, the history of Indonesia is far more complex than most 
tourist guidebooks and high school history texts would have us believe.  
 
 
Balinese puputan and acceptance 
 
One of the most poignant forms of resistance to Dutch colonialism was the 
dramatic confrontation between K.N.I.L.-troops and some of the Balinese 
groups in the South in 1906 and 1908. That confrontation involved mass 
suicide, not unlike the Jim Jones sect’s suicide in British Guiana. In Bali the 
killings and suicides were based on a worldview that is very difficult for 
modern people to fully understand. Some Balinese were shot by the 
K.N.I.L.-troops, but in many cases the children were killed by adults who 
then killed one another. Hundreds of men charged the troops in the belief 
that they were protected by the righteousness of their cause and their magic 
daggers (kris). Women stabbed their infants and then killed themselves as 
well. Many tourists have read the poignant, fictional account by a German 
writer who visited Bali in 1935.30  
                                                 
30 Vicki Baum, A tale from Bali (Singapore 1999) especially ‘The End’, 419-512. Also 
see the ‘Preface’, 7-10. This version was translated in 1937 by Basil Creighton. The 
Balinese word puputan is translated by Creighton as ‘the end.’ Baum interprets the 
puputan of Badung as ‘a heroic and medieval pride of arms’ against the ‘Realpolitik of 




 This is very important because the ritual mass suicide, called puputan 
(‘ending’), is represented by the nationalist narrative as the characteristic 
form of Balinese resistance. However, the island of Bali was not a unified 
territorial entity. After the demise of the Gelgel ‘kingdom’ in the 
seventeenth century Bali was characterized by a complex collection of small, 
quasi-independent ‘princedoms’ (ke-raja-an) like Karangasem, Gianyar, 
Bangli, Buleleng, Jembrana, Tabanan, Badung and Klungkung. There was 
no unitary government after the mid-seventeenth century, if indeed there 
ever had been one. Nevertheless there are two cases of dramatic puputan by 
several hundred followers of the raja of Badung of 1906 and of the raja of 
Klungkung of 1908. Those symbolic forms of ritual resistance cost the lives 
of hundreds of men, women and children.  
 Nevertheless, while the puputan is sometimes taken as the 
characteristic response to Dutch imperialism, that is not the whole truth. 
The heroic confrontations should certainly not be slighted, since they can 
be viewed as reflecting a deep loyalty to traditional ways of life in the face of 
superior military force from outside. But it is not the case that every small 
princedom resorted to mass suicide when confronted by N.E.I. armed 
force. In 1906 in Tabanan, the raja and his son committed suicide, but there 
was no puputan comparable to those that took place in Badung and 
Klungkung. Moreover, Buleleng and Jembrana had been defeated in 1849, 
after heroic struggles in 1846 and 1848. They came under more direct forms 
of rule in 1882. Direct rule in these cases means that officials approinted by 
the N.E.I. government took over administrative tasks. Karangasem, Gianyar 
and Bangli came under indirect rule (in 1896, 1901 and 1909, respectively) 
but came under more direct forms of rule relatively peacefully (in 1921, 
1917 and 1917). In other words, a full narrative account of events from 
1846 to 1921 indicates a variety of different forms of incorporation into 
more direct forms of rule under the banner of the N.E.I. colonial 
government. ‘Bangli, Gianyar and Karangasem – came under Dutch 
authority without military resistance around the turn of the century’.31 The 
                                                                                                             
Holland.’ The events covered in the novel span 1904-1906. The puputan of 1908 at 
Klungkung is not covered by the novel. 
31 Geoffrey Robinson, The dark side of paradise: political violence in Bali (Ithaca, N.Y. 
1995) 24-27. Robinson’s excellent study of the violence of the 1965-66 massacres, 
where probably at least 80 000 people died due to political upheaval on Bali – and 
approximately another 420 000 people, or more, died in the rest of Indonesia – also 
provides a very useful summary of the complex events during the pre-colonial and 




incorporation of Bali into the N.E.I. was a long and complicated process. 
The process that began with the signing of the Kuta Peace Treaty of July 
1849 involved much more that just violence and bloodshed. Internal 
rivalries played a role. Negotiations were sometimes effective. But no 
effective, widespread and coordinated rebellion took place. In that sense 
Bali was quite different from our next case: Aceh. 
 
 
Aceh and Muslim resistance 
 
Aceh is an extremely important case to consider. It is important because of 
the centrality of Islam in Aceh. The Aceh War would never have taken 
place if the form of Islam in Aceh had been the same as the form Islam 
took elsewhere in most of the archipelago. At various times a shari’a system 
of law was imposed (for example, by the ulama Nurud-din ar-Raniri during 
the rule of Iskandar Thani, 1637-1641). Aceh has been the most staunchly 
traditionalistic Islamic part of the archipelago since very early in history. In 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Aceh was one of the most 
important trading areas for Muslim merchants from as far away as the 
Middle East and Gujarat in India. It became particularly important when the 
Portuguese took Melaka. Under Sultan al-Kahar (1539-1571) and his son 
Aceh assumed central importance. Sultan Al-Mukammil (1589-1604) seized 
power and his grandson Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) was equally 
ruthless. He was defeated by the Portuguese in 1629. After a period of 
decline Aceh emerged as a major exporter of pepper in the 1790s. At the 
end of the nineteenth century pepper exports declined again and was 
replaced in some areas by tobacco, rubber and palm oil.32
To fully grasp resistance in the Aceh area it is important to examine 
aspects of Muslim societies and Islamic beliefs. One cannot understand the 
Aceh War without a solid background in the outlines of Islam. The mystical 
                                                                                                             
colonial eras. I have benefited from Robinson’s convenient narrative, as well as 
from Clifford Geertz, Negara (Princeton, N.J. 1970), and have not attempted here 
to summarize source material or the detailed Dutch literature on which they both 
rely. See also G. F. de Bruyn Kops, ‘Het evolutie tijdperk op Bali, 1906-1909’, 
Koloniaal tijdschrift 4 (1915) 459-479. 
32 Anthony Reid, ‘Aceh, between port and palace’; Lee Kam Hing, ‘Pepper and the 
revival of Aceh’; Taufik Abdullah, ‘Islamic networks as alternative identity’ in: 
Anthony Reid ed., Indonesian heritage, 52-43, 110-111, 116-117. 




ritual communities (tarekat) were of central importance. Also, movements 
spread from Mecca which were based on a relatively orthodox form of 
Islam (for example, Naqshabandiyah Sunni Islam). The study of Islamic 
Muslim societies is complex and requires an awareness of many subtleties 
that can easily be overlooked.33 The Southeast Asian context softened some 
of the more rigid aspects of Islamic dogma.34 The mystical and non-
denominational version of Islam, Sufism, which was a kind of mixture of 
Middle Eastern Islam and the mysticism of the India sub-continent, was 
especially important in Indonesia. But it was in Aceh that Middle Eastern 
forms of Islam were most important. The resistance to N.E.I. rule was not 
merely a resistance to colonialism. It was a resistance to modernity.  
Indeed, in some ways many Islamic theological and socio-political 
legal ideas are closer to the pre-Renaissance and pre-Reformation 
Worldview that Kugel35 lays out with respect to very early interpreters of 
the Talmud and Pentateuch.36 Allam points out that interpretation of Qur’an 
(Koran) requires careful attention to semantic (and pragmatic) linguistic 
clarity.37 The Qur’an is regarded as Allah’s word and hence has divine 
provenance. Since it is viewed as divinely inspired and sanctioned the oral 
message is a revelation. Caliph Utman (died 656) decided to follow the 
more conservative Basora school of Arabic grammar and his scholars 
codified the definitive Sunni version of the written text, which could not 
change after the death of Muhammad, the messenger and charismatic 
perfect man. ‘For the Shiites, on the contrary, the cycle of prophecy does 
not end, but continues throughout history’.38 The prophetic tradition is kept 
                                                 
33 I. M. Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies (Cambridge 1988). 
34 Rhoads Murphey, A history of Asia (New York 19962) 98-100. 
35 James Kugel, Traditions of the Bible: a guide to the Bible as it was at the start of the common 
era (Cambridge, MA 1998). Kugel only examines the first five books of the Bible 
(Torah, Pentateuch) here, but the general principles of first century hermeneutics 
apply to the other books as well. 
36 I use the word Talmud to describe the first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures, 
the Tanakh, and the word Pentateuch to indicate the first five books of the 
Christian Old Testament. In subtle ways the nuances of interpretation of those two 
texts are quite different, even though the words are almost the same when properly 
transliterated and translated. 
37 Khaled Fouad Allam, ‘Islam’, in: George Ritzer ed., The Blackwell encyclopedia of 
sociology (Malden, MA 2007) 2424-2428. 
38 Khaled Fouad Allam, ‘Islam’ 2428. See also J.-P. Charnay, Sociologie religieuse de 
l’Islam (Paris 1994); Collins, Sociology of philosophies, 387-428, 510-513. A comparative-




alive in Shia Islam through the succession of imams. For Sunnis the death of 
Muhammad in 632 AD ends revelation and theology is based on timeless, 
fixed dogma, but legal juridical interpretation continues. Hence, the study of 
Muslim societies requires careful differentiation of Sunni and Shiite faiths.39  
Due in part to its geographical location along major trade routes that 
go all the way to the Middle East, Aceh experienced a degree of direct 
Islamization very early, probably in the thirteenth century. Around 1515 
Banda Aceh, the port, had an Islamic ruler, Sultan Ali Muhayat Syah, and 
‘Aceh Dar us-Salam’ controlled the river mouth. Public life centered around 
the Great Mosque, Bait ur-Rahman, built in 1614 by Sultan Iskandar Muda.  
In an earlier chapter on the Aceh War I have tried to summarize some basic 
aspects of the conflict (1873-1913).40 The Netherlands had no real claim to 
Aceh, but the 1871 treaty of Sumatra between the Netherlands and Great 
Britain cleared the way for military action. The war was provoked by the 
N.E.I. government when officials refused to negotiate with responsible 
Acehnese leaders in Banda Aceh. In an action reminiscent of the declaration 
by President George W. Bush that the mission was ‘accomplished’ in Iraq, 
the Dutch declared the war over in 1881, but that was really just the middle 
of the first phase of the war.41 It is interesting to note that Anthony Reid 
ends his major study of the history of the region with a chapter on ‘The 
End of the Atjehnese Nation, 1885-1898’.42 Pepper exports declined and 
Aceh lost its place as the world’s leading exporter of pepper. In 1902-05 the 
Calvinist-inspired, neo-conservative government of the Netherlands (the 
government led by Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper) rewarded the 
proponents of aggressive military action (the ‘Atjeh School’) with key posts 
throughout the archipelago. Many precedents were set. For example, civil 
and military government were considered to be held jointly, an important 
                                                                                                             
historical sociological interpretation of Islam is not, of course, acceptable to all 
Islamic scholars and intellectuals.  
39 E. Gellner, Muslim society (Cambridge 1981). 
40 J.I. Bakker, ‘The Aceh war and the creation of the Netherlands East Indies state’ 
in: A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington eds., Great powers and little wars (Westport, CN 
1993) 53-82. 
41 The military course of the war is summarized in English by C. M Schulten, 
‘Tactics of the Dutch colonial army in the Netherlands East Indies’, Revue 
internationale d’histoire militaire (Paris 1988). Schulten argues that the war had three 
phases: 1873-93, 1894-1903, 1904-13. 
42 Anthony Reid, The contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and 
Britain, 1858-1898 (London and Kuala Lumpur 1969). 




precedent for the Republic of Indonesia’s concept of ‘two functions’ (dwi-
fungsi), military and civil. I have commented on several key personalities of 
that struggle, especially General Johannes Benedictus van Heutsz, Daud 
Beureueh, Teungku Cik Di Toro, and Professor Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje. 
Let me re-emphasize here the role of Teungku Cik Di Toro (1836-
1891), of the Tiro family. The ulamas from Tiro were said to have 
originated with a Javanese haji who settled in Pidie. Tiro became a center of 
Islamic learning. Toro and his four sons led six thousand men in a holy war 
(jihad, perang sabil) against the colonial government, that was still known as 
the kuempeni, even though the V.O.C. had ceased almost a hundred years 
earlier. He sent letters to the uleebelangs to encourage them to fight for 
Allah against the infidel. Two of his sons died in fierce hand-to-hand 
fighting in 1896 and a grandson died in battle in 1911. In a situation that is 
repeated in many places in the world today, there was little if any 
recognition by the ‘Europeans’ (the N.E.I. government or the European 
officers of the K.N.I.L.) of the legitimacy of the moral outrage of the local 
(in this case Acehnese) jihadi guerillas. 
 The Shiite Islamic notion of power emanating from a charismatic 
imam was very important in Aceh and may have been more important than 
the Sunni concept of the source of legitimate authority stemming from a 
sacred community (the umma).43 This had an impact long after the Aceh 
War. For example, James Siegel describes the ulama Daud Beureueh’s role 
in Aceh in the 1940s and 1950s.44 He was a rival of the uleebelang Teuku 
Keumangan Oemar. Daud Beureueh led the Acehnese rebellion against the 
Republican government centered in Java and South Sumatra. Ultimately the 
Republican government supported a largely ‘secular’ notion of the 
European style nation-state, and Sukarno’s conceptualization of the five 
basic principles (Pancasila) can be viewed as a rejection of Islamic political 
ideas. Suharto also believed in Javanese religion (agama Jawa). The Javanese-
dominated government of the Republic of Indonesia is not Islamic.  
 The Acehnese are not closely related to the Javanese; at a certain 
stage of history they looked to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East 
and India for precedents. Their language is related to the language spoken 
                                                 
43 Clifford Geertz, Islam observed: religious development in Morocco and Indonesia (New 
Haven, CN 1968). See also Marshall G. Hodgson, The venture of Islam (Chicago 1974) 
for an excellent general scholarly overview from a Western perspective.  
44 James Siegel, The rope of God (Berkeley, CA 1969). 




by the Cham (from ancient Champa in South Vietnam). Language, of 
course, is a key to identity in an archipelago as diverse as Indonesia.45 
Despite its clear relevance to Java, traditional Islam has been more centrally 
important in Aceh than it has been in Java. In Java the Buddhist and Hindu 
background was such that layers of Islamic influence were to some degree 
ameliorated, a separate agama Java existed, and a significant portion of the 
population was not Muslim, or only nominally Muslim.46 The same can 
probably be said, albeit for different reasons, for the Buton Sultanate. 
 
 
The Buton Sultanate 
 
The complete history of Buton remains to be written, but we do have an 
excellent source, and enough is known about the Butonese and their rivals 
in Ternate, Makassar, and the diaspora Buginese, to present a few tentative 
idealized generalizations.47 The main point about Buton is that to a large 
extent the Butonese actually benefited from Dutch indirect rule and 
colonialism. Although Buton was an Islamic Sultanate, the reaction to 
Dutch indirect rule was quite different in Buton than in Aceh. Islam played 
a different role in Buton than it did in Aceh, for a host of complex reasons. 
Hence, one can speculate, on the basis of available documents, that the 
rulers and the people largely accepted Dutch indirect rule as a relatively 
                                                 
45 J.I. Bakker, ‘Language’ in: George Ritzer ed., The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology 
(Malden, MA 2007) 2533-2539; None of the three cases discussed here can be fully 
understood without knowledge of the indigenous languages spoken in Bali, Aceh 
and Buton. Berg, for example, has studied the various languages of Buton and 
Muna, like Wolio and Muna, including the little known Cia-Cia language spoken by 
only 60 000 or so people. A full historical account of the situation in Buton has yet 
to be written, in part since no one has had all of the language skills that would be 
required. See ‘Languages of Indonesia (Sulawesi)’ in: Ethnologue: Languages of the 
world, 15th edition (Dallas, TX 2008) 639-3 and www.ethnologue.com, a website for 
the Summer Institute for Linguistics. 
46 John Miksic ed., Indonesian heritage: Ancient history (Singapore and Jakarta 2001). 
This source is cited above for specific articles on Bali, but it has a wide scope. 
47 Pim Schoorl, ‘Islam, macht en ontwikkeling in het sultanaat Buton’, Islam en macht: 
een historisch antropologisch perspectief (Assen and Maastricht 1987) 52-65, 142, 148-149. 
See also Pim Schoorl, ‘Het eeuwige verbond tussen Buton en de V.O.C., 1613-
1669’ in: Harry A. Poeze and Pim Schoorl ed., Excursies in Celebes: een bundel bijdragen, 
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progressive development, all things considered. They do not so much 
constitute a case of resistance as an example of acceptance of Dutch power 
as a relatively beneficial counter-influence in an isolated area and a very 
complex situation. There were many players in a series of complex and 
shifting alliances. 
 One of the few general histories of Indonesia to even mention Buton 
(Butung) is by Jean Taylor, who is a student of the eminent Indonesian 
historian John R.W. Smail.48 Smail himself wrote about the importance of 
attempting to formulate an ‘autonomous history’ of Southeast Asia.49 
Taylor touches on Buton because she summarizes many aspects of the 
history of Indonesia. She attempts as much as possible to provide what she 
calls ‘an Indonesian-centered account.’ Like many contemporary historians, 
she attempts to escape the constricting influences of a European-centered 
account where indigenous people ‘fade into the background as observers, 
victims, or converts’. In other words, she tries to avoid the dilemma so 
cogently emphasized by Eric Wolf in his famous book Europe and the people 
without history.50 If we wish to avoid a Eurocentric narrative then we must 
pay particular attention to the historical materials that are locally based, as in 
Ricklefs’ careful study of a Javanese chronicle and in Sjamsuddin’s study of 
Kalimantan.51 We must, whenever possible, let indigenous people speak for 
themselves.  
When it comes to the Butonese and Munanese the idea of a ‘people 
without history’ is exemplified in spades.52 Very few people have ever heard 
of Muna Island, where I did field work, and the Buton Sultanate does not 
merit much more than a footnote in most standard works on Indonesian 
history. Buton is often considered insignificant, yet if we are going to fully 
understand resistance in Indonesia we should not be misled into thinking 
that Aceh is important while Buton is not.  
                                                 
48 Taylor, Indonesia. For this paragraph I have relied on her work above, note 10. 
49 D. J. Steinberg et al. eds. In search of Southeast Asia: A modern history (Honolulu, 
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50 Eric Wolf, Europe and the people without history (Berkeley, CA 1982). 
51 M.C. Ricklefs, Modern Javanese historical tradition: A study of an original 
Kartasura chronicle and related materials (London 1978); Sjamsuddin, ‘Islam and 
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52 The best succinct summary in English is Pim Schoorl, ‘Butonese’. The former 
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 Fig. 2: The mosque at Buton, as viewed from the fortress. The buildings were 
not in good condition. Source: author’s private collection. 
To some extent Taylor examines ‘sultanates’ and sultans ‘through Islam’, 
that is, through Islamic writing. But as a product of modern European 
scholarship she shares assumptions first formulated during the Renaissance 
that seem like common sense to many people in the West but which 
contrast greatly with the traditional assumptions of almost all ancient and 
medieval Jewish, Christian and Islamic interpreters. So it is hardly the case 
in any precise sense that Taylor is writing the history of the Islamic petty 
states (like Ternate, Demak, Tuban, Gresik, Cirebon, Gorontalo, Luwu, 
Taoo’, Gowa and Bima) from a Sunni or even a Shiite perspective. She is an 
American scholar who accepts Enlightenment values in her historical work. 
The ‘hidden’ esoteric meanings of the Qur’an are not considered by modern 
historians, like Smail and Taylor (or Fairbank and Murphey), to apply 
directly to specific events in the archipelago in the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries! For example, the eruption at Krakatau is 
not considered by modern historians to have been anticipated by Allah in 
his words to Mohammad in 632 AD53 Enlightenment assumptions include 
the idea that sacred scriptures do not contain detailed predictions of events 
happening hundreds of years later. Ironically, the relative neglect of the 
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Buton Sultanate is precisely due to the fact that Islamic traditional ideas 
were less directly relevant there. There was no Buton War. There was no 
active resistance. Hence, it becomes less interesting to historians of 
resistance. But if we want to get at the whole truth of colonialism then we 





As stated, in this paper I have briefly discussed examples from Bali, Aceh 
and Buton. It would require at least three lengthy books to even begin to do 
those cases justice – much less begin to review in even a preliminary 
manner all of the possibly relevant cases – hence I have supplied a list of 
recommended, suggested readings. It is a long list, but far too short to 
satisfy most experts.54 The case of Aceh fills lengthy books and resistance in 
Bali has been widely reported, although the true nature of traditional 
Balinese rulership is the subject of dispute. The least discussed case is the 
Buton Sultanate. Some work has been done and that case deserves to be 
better known, particularly in light of its theoretical importance as a counter 
to simplistic arguments about resistance.  
 To fully understand the postcolonial situation in the Republic of 
Indonesia we need to move beyond stereotypes concerning a uniform 
structure of domination. I myself have been guilty to some extent of over-
emphasizing the central role of the Javanese court culture. While it may be 
true that the patrimonialism of the Central Javanese kratons is an important 
part of the story, particularly for Java and Bali, it is nevertheless also true 
that the importance of Islamic theories of ’asabiyya should be given careful 
consideration. Just as the study of modern terrorism requires study of peer 
group influences,55 the study of resistance challenges us to have a better 
grasp of the complexities of Southeast-Asian adaptations of Islam, 
particularly Sufism. More work needs to be done comparing the various 
Islamic states. We need to examine their own internal relationships, as well 
as their ties to India and the Middle East. There are several detailed studies, 
but there does not seem to be one comprehensive examination of the 
importance of various forms of Islam for Muslim societies throughout the 
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archipelago.56 Detailed overviews, like Pelras’s study of the Bugis, requires a 
great deal of work and a variety of historical, linguistic and ethnographic 
skills.57
 When I visited Ceribon in 1976 it was surprising how important the 
ziarah veneration of the graves (tombs) of Islamic holy men (wali) like Sunan 
Gunung Jati (that is perhaps She Lĕmahbang) still was.58 At that time I did 
not know enough about the Javanese calendar to fully understand, but 
friends had told me an important ceremony was going to be happening. 
Thousands of people crowded into a small space in celebration of a man 
who had brought Islam to Sunda’s Pajajaran and is considered by some to 
be an exemplar of the Islamic concept of a perfect man (Rasulullah, the al-
Insan al-Kamil). Indeed, the ‘saints’ of Java are still important throughout 
Java.59 A major procession featured the rulers of Ceribon in such a way that 
for an instant I felt like I was back in the seventeenth century, or even 
earlier. Ceribon is geographically close to Jakarta and Bandung, but it is 
culturally much closer to the coastal pasisir states of an earlier era. It is a 
vestige of a time which has largely been lost to modern (and postmodern) 
life in the globalized, urban Java of the twenty-first century.  
 The excellent work done by Johns and many others provides a 
beginning,60 but hopefully in the future Indonesian scholars will provide 
more detailed studies of the sociological history of the inter-relationship 
between European and non-European outside forces. Buton and Aceh were 
both Islamic, but their forms of resistance were quite different. Indonesia is 
far too complex a place to allow for generalizations that take global terms 
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like ‘Christianity,’ ‘imperialism,’ ‘colonialism,’ and ‘Islam’ at face value. If we 
reify the words we do an injustice to the realities.61
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